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THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT




The original hearings on the nomination of Clarence Thomas
brought much political posturing and theatrical grilling of the
nominee. That much was expected in light of the Bork, Kennedy,
and Souter hearings. As on those prior occasions, the Senators
elected to define their constitutional "consent" function by prob-
ing, by turns gingerly and testily, the nominee's political views.
As then became painfully obvious, from October 11 th to the
13th the nomination hearing self-destructed. The scripted was
out; the unexpected was in. Senators, staff, and media descended
into a miasma of sexual allegations, hard-ball politics, betrayed
confidences, and half-baked psychoanalysis. By the time the wal-
lowing ceased, the substance of the charges had become less the
issue than "the process" itself and the participants therein.
Anita Hill's charges of sexual harassment against Clarence
Thomas were a political neutron bomb. The edifice-the confir-
mation process-still stands. But those associated with the charges
were burned. Accuser and accused, along with their senatorial
champions on the Judiciary Committee, were casualties. The Pres-
ident, the Supreme Court, the liberal interest groups, the media,
and both political parties suffered from the exposure'
In the end, Americans themselves stand indicted of political im-
maturity, hypocrisy, and prudishness, especially in the view of
many who could treat the spectacle with more political dispassion.
Among numerous similar quotations, the Wall Street Journal
printed the conclusion of a London Sunday Times reporter who
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law; B.A. 1973, Pomona Col-
lege: J.D. 1978, Stanford Law School.
Michael McQueen, Polled Voters Show Broad Agreement on Outcome of the Thomas Hear-
ings, WALL ST_ J., Oct. 17, 1991, at A24.
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stated, "America has flung itself again into one of the spasms of
passionate moral debate that nations more tolerant of human
frailty find so hard to understand."' When asked whether some-
thing like the Thomas hearings had ever occurred in Europe, the
BBC's Washington correspondent replied, "Not since they used to
bait bears in the Middle Ages."'3 And finally, columnist Barbara
Amiel of the London Sunday Times wrote, "Extreme feminism is
now a state religion in America .... People are being disentitled
to their own sexuality .... This all goes fundamentally against a
free society.""
In the wake of this distasteful spectacle, there have been many
calls for reform of "the process." Only Senator Joseph Biden
from the outset spoke in favor of the confirmation process,
though even he appeared to do so somewhat defensively at times.
This clamor for formal structural change is understandable. Yet,
given the public's limited attention span in political matters, and
politicians' reluctance to keep the pot boiling when their own po-
litical skins are at risk, the political momentum necessary for con-
stitutional or other formal changes is not likely to be maintained.
That is as it should be. The formal process is not the problem; the
attitudes of the participants are.
This article examines three proposals that have been made to
"reform" the selection of United States Supreme Court Justices.
The first is to give the Senate a formal role in screening judicial
nominees before nomination. This is the only one that can be said
to affect directly the constitutional allocation of power between
the President and the Senate. The other two proposals are to se-
lect nominees either on qualification only or to achieve an unde-
' David Brooks, Thomas Hearings Horrify Europe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1991, at A18.
3 Id.
Barbara Amiel, Notable & Quotable, WALL ST. J., October 14, 1991, at A12; Barbara
Amiel, Feminist Harassment, NATIONAL REVIEW, Nov. 4, 1991, at 14, 15.
The opinions expressed by European observers were by no means the product of politi-
cal conservatism. David Brooks cites editorials in British, French, and Italian publications
of conservative, liberal, and, even, leftist orientation. The author of this article read a re-
port about the Thomas hearings in the German publication Der Spiegel. That publication, a
left-wing paradigm of "political correctness," did not report sympathetically on Clarence
Thomas and the Republicans. That much was expected. But even that report questioned
whether Thomas's alleged conduct against Hill amounted to disqualifying sexual
harassment.
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fined ideological balance. These are discretionary political crite-
ria, not structural constitutional commands. The article concludes
that the formal process is essentially sound, and that improvement
must come through political self-restraint by the participants.
Confirmation of a Supreme Court Justice is a constitutional
function of the Senate under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion. It is the constitutional counterweight to the President's au-
thority to nominate. It has been argued that the Senate's function
is actually two-fold. The first step is to advise, and a later, inde-
pendent step is to consent. However, both literally and practically,
pre-nomination advice is not part of the Senate's constitutional
role. The exact text of Article II, Section 2 is: "[The President]
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court .... "
Literally, the advice function refers to a process of appointment
after the nomination.
Historical evidence bears out this distinction. In various Feder-
alist Papers, Alexander Hamilton explained the purpose of sepa-
rating the nomination and appointment/confirmation processes:
It will be the office of the President to "nominate," and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to "appoint." There
will, of course, be no exertion of "choice" on the part of the
Senate. They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and
oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves
"choose"--they can only ratify or reject the choice he may
have made. 5
Hamilton also pointed out the danger that comes from giving the
Senate a role in the nomination, as compared to the confirmation,
process. An individual, such as the President, is far less likely to
engage in horse-trading-"Give us the man we wish for this of-
fice, and you shall have the one you wish for that"-than an
assembly.'
The Convention Debates record similar concerns. For example,
under the Virginia Plan, judges were to be appointed by the na-
THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id. at 456.
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tional legislature.7 This was a common method of selection under
early state law. But that aspect of the Virginia Plan was soon at-
tacked in the national convention. James Wilson, for one, argued
"Experience showed the impropriety of such appointments by nu-
merous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the nec-
essary consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive
was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible per-
son." 8 The approach favored by Wilson was incorporated into the
New Jersey Plan by William Paterson.' Others, including James
Madison, argued for appointment by the Senate." The matter
went back and forth but by June 18, 1787, the final plan took
shape and was presented by Alexander Hamilton. That plan pro-
vided for the nomination of, among others, judges by the President
("Governour"). The Senate was to have "the power of approving
or rejecting" those nominees."- Hamilton's plan reflected the
evolving consensus of the Convention that the Senate was to have
a reactive function only. That consensus crystallized in the report
of the Committee of Eleven on September 3, 1787,12 and the de-
bate of September 7, 1787, after which the modern language was
approved by unanimous vote. 3
The concern about the corruptive effect of an affirmative Sen-
ate role in the nomination process is also reflected in the debate
over "senatorial courtesy." In its purest form, senatorial courtesy
allows a Senator of the President's party to block nominations to
federal judgeships within the Senator's state. This led, for a time,
to the practice of having Senators, in effect, control nominations
to the lower federal bench within their states as long as the Sena-
tors were of the President's party. President Hoover wrote:
I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION] (citing J. Madison).
8 Id. at 119 (citing J. Madison).
" Id. at 244 (citing J. Madison).
10 Id. at 120 (citing J. Madison) & 128 (citing R. King). Madison's proposal was adopted
in the report of the Committee of the Whole on Edmund Randolph's proposition (the
"Virginia Plan"). Id. at 236 (citing J. Madison).
" Id. at 292 (citing j. Madison). It should be noted that Hamilton proposed to let the
President have the sole power to appoint the heads of the departments of Finance, War,
and Foreign Affairs.
12 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 495 (citing J. Madison).
13 Id. at 539 (citing J. Madison).
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At the time I began my term as President, the Senators were
practically choosing the Federal Judges. Since they controlled
confirmation of the Presid ent's appointment, the practice had
grown up for the President to accept their nominees unless
there was substantial opposition. The Senators, by control of
appointments of Judges, were able to secure from them ap-
pointments to judicial staffs and to influence such jobs as re-
ceiverships to their own law firms or their friends. The result
was the standards needed for Judges were far below the level
which the then Attorney General and I could wish.14
Hoover might have been exaggerating the effect of senatorial
courtesy. Moreover, the interest of individual Senators in Su-
preme Court appointments is likely to be far less parochial than in
lower court appointments. After all, senatorial courtesy is not a
factor in Supreme Court appointments. Still, the Hoover letter
corroborates the dangers perceived by the Framers of the Consti-
tution in giving the Senate anything other than a formal negative
role.
In any event, Presidents long ago abandoned any formal senato-
rial pre-screening of Supreme Court nominees-if such a process
was ever tried. Even with a nominee to a lower federal court, the
President today only consults informally with the Senators from
the forum state who are of the President's party. Current calls by
some Democrats to have the President formally submit a list of
Supreme Court nominees to the Senate for pre-screening go
against long-standing practice and appear to violate the Constitu-
tion's separation of the nominating and confirming processes. Of
course, President Bush is free constitutionally to undertake infor-
mal consultation with various .Senators, but he is unlikely to agree
to a formal surrender of his Article II prerogatives.
A second "reform," related to the first, is to "depoliticize" the
selection process. This could be simply a call to pick the "best and
the brightest" for Supreme Court service. As should be obvious,
the Court, as an institution, has never been a meritocracy. The
judicial house is haunted by the ghosts of many Supreme Court
Justices of whom it might be said that they satisfied Senator Ro-
'" HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES 12 (1972).
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man Hruska's (R-Neb.) wistful observation in 1970 that mediocre
people also deserve representation on the Supreme Court. 5 As
long as politicians nominate and confirm Justices to a Court that
has sometimes seemed to revel in its increasingly political activism
over the last forty years, merit and qualification will continue to
play a supporting, not starring, role. Just ask Robert Bork. If a
nominee has a powerful legal mind, that is a welcome, but nones-
sential characteristic. Of course, the process might be changed
along the lines suggested by Benjamin Franklin during the consti-
tutional debates in 1787:
[Franklin] then in a brief and entertaining manner related a
Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the
Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in
order to get rid of him, and share his practice (among
themselves).1
No one has yet proposed changing the Constitution to require
nominating the high scorer on a legal competency exam. Not the
least reason for that reluctance would be the chimerical task of
developing a satisfactory exam. Even in California, where nomi-
nees are named by the governor subject to approval by the Com-
mission on Judicial Appointments, 7 the emphasis in a nomination
is on politics, not legal knowledge. That is not to say that most, or
even any, Supreme Court nominees have been stupid or ignorant
of the law. It is only to doubt that legal or judicial craftsmanship,
as contrasted with minimal competency, is what drives the process.
That may be just as well. A bench of nine Platos, or Joseph
Storys, or even Robert Borks or Gerald Gunthers might be more
than the Court or the country could tolerate. One can only shud-
der at the opinions such a bench might produce-each opinion
15 JOHN MASSAR, SUPREMELY POLITICAL 110 (1990). The exact quotation is: "There are a
lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers, and they are entitled to a little representa-
tion, aren't they? We can't have all Brandeises, Frankfurters, and Cardozos." Id. (citing
N.Y. TIME, Mar. 17, 1970, at A21).
10 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 7, at 120 (citing J. Madison).
1 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(d) (1981). The Commission on Judicial Appointments con-
sists of the chief justice of the California Supreme Court, the state attorney general,
and-in a Supreme Court nomination-the longest-serving presiding justice of any district
of the state courts of appeal.
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seriatim and exquisite in a- different teaching of high theory, but
incomprehensible as a useful guide to legislators, lawyers, and lay-
men. Still, one or two intellectual giants give the Court a sense of
direction. Nominations of such caliber are so rarely made that it is
a loss to the Court and the country when one is rejected by the
Senate on political grounds, as happened with Robert Bork.
Paradoxically, calls to "depoliticize" the selection of Supreme
Court Justices are often combined with demands that the Presi-
dent select nominees with an eye toward ideological balance on
the Court. Such demands actually place special emphasis on the
political ideology of the nominee. "Ideological balance" is usually
described in political, not judicial terms. The goal is to get the
President to nominate individuals who will vote for a political re-
sult desired by the political "out" group. An example is the cam-
paign of liberal interest groups after the resignations of Lewis
Powell, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall to obtain the
nomination of someone who would support a constitutional right
of unrestricted abortion. There is rarely an intellectually honest
call for a particular judicial philosophy, such as "strict construc-
tion," "majoritarianism" or "natural rights."
Indeed, the Thomas hearings once again showed the hypocrisy
behind demands for "balance" on the Court. Robert Bork had
been pilloried for not finding a general right of privacy in the
Constitution. Because of his judicial philosophy, Bork was seen as
politically opposed to unrestricted abortion. He was also castigated
for refusing to allow natural rights generalities to intrude into the
resolution of specific constitutional issues. One of his chief tor-
mentors was Professor Laurence Tribe.18
Yet, when Clarence Thomas was nominated, the same anti-Bork
activists decried Thomas's appeal for natural rights to supply con-
tent to constitutional provisions. The concern was that Thomas
might use natural rights to find a general right to life in the Con-
stitution. He, too, was seen as politically opposed to unrestricted
abortion. One of his leading critics was Professor Laurence
Tribe. 9 The issue in Bork's case, as well as Thomas', was not pos-
Jacob Weisberg, Laurence Tribe, Supreme Courtier, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 24, 1991, at 6.
Id. (citing Laurence Tribe, Clarence Thomas and "'Natural Law", N.Y. TiMEs, July 15,
Journal of Legal Commentary
itivism versus natural rights, but abortion versus no-abortion. Ann
Lewis, 1988 campaign director for Jesse Jackson and feminist
Democratic Party activist, freely admitted this in the early hours
of October 11, 1991 on CNN's Crossfire program. In the course of
debate on the upcoming hearing into Anita Hill's claims, Ms.
Lewis reminded her opponents that the key issue regarding Clar-
ence Thomas was abortion, not sexual harassment."
"Ideological balance" is not merely a cover for political correct-
ness on the bench. It is historically unprecedented as a strategy of
presidential nominations. One can concede that both the Presi-
dent and the Senate have the authority to consider a nominee's
political views. If that is the case, one would expect the President
to nominate individuals sympathetic to his political ideology. It is
as ludicrous to expect George Bush to nominate Abner Mikva or
Patricia Wald as it would be to expect a President Michael
Dukakis to have nominated Alex Kozinski or Richard Posner.
Historically, ideological balance on the Court has not been the
result of a conscious strategy by Presidents. On the contrary,
when it has occurred, it has done so despite the appointment strat-
egy of individual Presidents. A new Supreme Court Justice is ap-
pointed on average about every two years. Thus, each presidential
term should produce two appointments. It would require control
of the White House by the same party for three straight terms for
there to be a reasonable chance of changing the ideological tilt of
the Court. It would require an even longer period of time to ce-
ment that change. Presumably, such long-term continuous occu-
pancy of the White House by the same political party reflects a
general acceptance by the public of that party's position on most
of the controversial issues of the day.
Presidential politics during this century have been characterized
by alternating periods of dominance by one party or the other.
With the exception of 1932 to 1952, however, that dominance has
not led to the exclusion of the "out" party from the White House
for such long periods as to eliminate the opposing ideology from
1991 (Op. Ed.), at A15).
0 Personal observation by the author of the CNN program Crossfire, shown between
midnight and 12:30 A.M. on cable channel 19, in an exchange among co-host Patrick
Buchanan, Ms. Lewis, and guest Brent Bozell.
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the Court. The virtual exclusion of conservatives from the Court
in the 1960's and the similarly endangered status of liberals now
are partly the result of bad timing. Not every President has had a
chance to appoint a proportionately equal number of Justices.
William Taft, in his single term, appointed five Justices. Herbert
Hoover appointed three. President Jimmy Carter, on the other
hand, became the only elected President to serve four years with-
out an appointment to the Supreme Court. It is safe to say that
the current ideological complexion of the Court would look
rather different had Jimmy Carter appointed two Justices.
Moreover, even a strategy for ideological balance (or domi-
nance) can be upset by "mistakes" in appointment. There have
been a number of instances where the President's expectations
about a nominee's ideology have not been satisfied. William John-
son, despite his reputation as the first "great dissenter," was never
sufficiently Republican on the Court to suit Thomas Jefferson.
When Holmes, shortly after his appointment to the Court, wrote
the dissent to the government's 5-4 victory in the Northern Securi-
ties 1 antitrust case in 1904, a disappointed Theodore Roosevelt is
supposed to have remarked that "a banana has more backbone
than Oliver Wendell Holmes."
Better known is Eisenhower's evaluation of his appointment of
Earl Warren as the "worst mistake" he made. It has been said that
Ike made that remark about William Brennan. Maybe he said it
about both. As least, he must have thought it. Had those two ap-
pointees been political conservatives, there might have resulted a
modicum of ideological balance on the 1960's Court.
If ideological balance has been the product of chance, not de-
sign, other types of balance more clearly have been the result of
presidential strategy. Geographic interests have long been impor-
tant, though they are less so today than in the 19th century. It has
been rumored that the presence of too many New Yorkers on the
Court kept Learned Hand out of the running for a seat. The pres-
ence on the Court today of Rehnquist, O'Connor and Kennedy
makes it difficult for another resident of the Ninth Circuit to be
appointed.
21 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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Interest group politics create a "balance" of sorts. Politically
visible pressure groups, particularly if they are components of the
President's electoral coalition, may be rewarded by having "one of
their own" appointed. Labor unions, Catholics, Jews, racial or eth-
nic groups, women, and even immigrants have had their "seats."
After a while, these groups may lose those seats, but people who
happen to share their characteristics may still be appointed. To-
day, a Catholic or a Jew would likely be appointed for reasons
other than conscious regard of his or her religion.
. It also must be pointed out that, essentially, a strategy for gen-
eral ideological balance (or dominance) on the Court is quixotic.
At best, a President can be reasonably certain that a nominee will
agree with the President's political outlook on one or two public
issues. Given that a Supreme Court Justice serves an average of
twenty years, there is no way for the President to ensure that a
nominee will vote the President's way on unforeseen future mat-
ters of controversy. In that vein, the Franklin D. Roosevelt ap-
pointees, as expected, upheld New Deal legislation and radically
altered the Court's course in economic and social regulation.
However, that coalition showed fractures in separation of powers,
equal protection, criminal procedure, speech, and religion cases.
Richard Nixon's "bloc" was no more solid. Though they could be
expected to be "tough on crime," at least until Harry Blackmun
began to change in the mid-to-late 1970's, the four "Nixon Jus-
tices" (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist) often differed on
equal protection, substantive due process, speech, and religion.
Even now, speculation has begun that the new "conservative
bloc" will split over the religion clauses and over the protection of
economic property rights. In the latter context, much is being
made of the difference between "traditional judicial-restraint con-
servatives," such as William Rehnquist and Byron White, and "ju-
dicial libertarian" conservatives, such as Antonin Scalia.
Various other proposals have been made to tinker with the pro-
cess. For example, President Bush has proposed to limit access to
confidential FBI reports and to have the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee conduct hearings into incendiary and difficult-to-prove charges
in executive session. Indeed, originally the FBI reports were not
shared with the Senate because of the injustice that might be done
188
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to innocent people if the reports were leaked. Probably very few
people believe, however, that such changes will have any effect.
The information, whether in FBI reports or otherwise, will still be
leaked, as long as there is a market for it. The President's propos-
als treat the symptom, not the cause.
Perhaps nothing can be done in a formal sense. But there are
some changes that might produce more rational debate during ju-
dicial selection. These proposals are undoubtedly idealistic be-
cause they require a self-imposed moderation and restraint totally
at odds with the fundamental character of politicians seeking
votes; staff minions seeking "insider status" through the press;
media ferrets seeking exposure and ratings; interest groups seek-
ing contributions from supporters; and the public seeking Oprah-
Phil-Geraldo titillation. Still, seeing so starkly how legislation is
made may have shocked enough viewers that, for at least a brief
moment, reason and sanity have a chance to establish themselves.
First, the President and the Senate should consider the nomi-
nee's judicial philosophy, not his or her views on particular politi-
cal issues. It is true that the constitutional prerogatives of the
President and the Senate in the confirmation process allow them
to consider any factors they wish. Still, authority pressed to its ful-
lest is not usually a sign of wisdom and never a sign of modera-
tion. In that vein, the President and the Senate should focus on
the nominee's views on the role of the judiciary in a democratic
republic; his or her conception of popular sovereignty; his or her
understanding of the role of judicial review and the limits of the
judicial power; his or her view of the limits of the law to coerce
individuals; and, most of all, his or her recognition that the Con-
stitution is different from constitutional law and that it is the writ-
ten Constitution that, according to Marbury v. Madison,22 gives the
courts competency to act in constitutional matters. A leopard does
not change its spots, goes the saying, and the judge whose record
establishes a respect for the supremacy of the written Constitution
over the courts is not likely to turn into a judicial activist who
reads his or her values into the Constitution.
Second, the reporters should report and the analysts should de-
" 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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bate thoroughly the judicial philosophy of the nominee. They
should refrain from reporting anything else, unless it involves an
indictable offense (including consideration of the time elapsed
since the alleged offense) or some ongoing behavior that would af-
fect the nominee's physical, mental, or ethical fitness to serve. A
continuing drug addiction or treatment for psychological ailments
should be reported, but a nominee's sexual practices with con-
senting adults, marital discords with former spouses, or marijuana
use fifteen years earlier should not.
Catherine MacKinnon and other feminists were virtual fixtures
on television, where every fact was forced into the feminist Pro-
crustean bed."3 CNN's Mary Tillotson never let the facts or public
opinion polls get in the way of her ideology while she was "report-
ing."" The general problems of sexual harassment, male-female
relations, and sexism everywhere became the topics of the hour.
That is hardly astonishing, as a thorough analysis of judicial phi-
losophy requires more intellectual raw material and neutral en-
gagement than does the pop-psychology of feminist paranoia.
Third, except as they contribute to exploring the aforemen-
tioned concerns, interest groups should be excluded from the pro-
cess. In any event, they must be made to step forward and subject
themselves to the same scrutiny as they wish upon their victims.
Lying in wait, making false accusations, leaking distortions and de-
rogatory innuendos, and otherwise making judgments from the
protective darkness of anonymity contributes nothing to rational
debate. Such interest groups include not only the Alliance for Jus-
tice and People for the American Way, but also the increasingly
politicized and politically correct American Bar Association. Per-
haps the time has come to eliminate the role of the ABA's Stand-
ing Committee on the federal judiciary in the appointment of
judges. That role might be placed in the hands of a more impar-
tial legal body than an unelected elitist trade group.
23 Christina Sommers, Hard-Line Feminists Guilty of Ms-Representation, WALL ST. J., Nov.
7, 1991, at A14.
24 Personal observation of the author during the hearings on Anita Hill's charges. For a
similar impression and a comment on the liberal bias of (particularly female) reporters as
compared to the views of the public at large, see S. Robert Lichter, Hill vs. Thomas: Why the
Media Just Didn't Get It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1991, at A16.
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Fourth, the public should immediately boycott any of the above
who violate the rules. If a Senator subverts the appearance of dig-
nity necessary for legal and governmental legitimacy by pursuing
irrelevant, salacious, and harmful accusations against a nominee,
that Senator should be defeated, recalled, or publicly censured. If
reporters engage in such conduct, the public should refuse to buy
their newspapers.
Again, one is probably tilting at windmills in hoping for such a
regime so utterly dependent on moderation and self-restraint. But
if such an ethic of respect, tolerance, and civility were to take
root, the process of selecting a Justice or other aspirant to an of-
fice of high honor would become a time for pride in our institu-
tions and joy for the nominee. And, as is often the case, a change
produced by informal cultural processes is likely to be more last-
ing and effective than a change mandated simply by formal consti-
tutional command. The only likely alternative, particularly when
different parties control the presidency and the Senate, is more of
the same.

